Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans by Ng, Ho Kuen
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006 Finance Department
1995
Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans
Ho Kuen Ng
San Jose State University., ng@sjsumcs.sjsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance
Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006 by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Ng, Ho Kuen, "Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans" (1995). Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006. 130.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap/130
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans 
Ho Kuen Ng* 
Abstract 
Cross-tested plans are defined contribution plans that test allocations for 
nondiscrimination. The test is based on a plan's actuarial equivalent annuity 
benefits. Cross-tested plans have become popular among small plan sponsors 
after the release of the nondiscrimination regulations. This paper investigates 
the pros and cons of cross-testing. 
Key words and phrases: pension plan, nondiscrimination, cross-testing, highly 
compensated employees 
1 Introduction 
For a retirement plan in the United States to be qualified and enjoy 
all accompanying tax advantages, it must satisfy the requirements in 
Internal Revenue Code section 401(a). Paragraph (4) of section 401(a) 
requires that a plan not discriminate in favor of highly compensated 
employees, as defined in Code section 414(q), based on compensation, 
ownership, and employment status. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has published voluminous reg-
ulations on the application of this paragraph. These regulations have 
brought renewed interest in a plan design based on the technique known 
as cross-testing. Although this technique has existed for many years, 
it recently has drawn much attention in the employee benefits commu-
nity. Its status had been uncertain because of legislative proposals to 
ban its use in defined contribution plans. The banning language was 
deleted from the Retirement Protection Act, however, before it became 
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law in December 1994. Now that the fate of cross-testing seems certain, 
at least in the foreseeable future we will take a look into what it is and 
why it has created such controversy. 
To the Internal Revenue Service, the nondiscrimination requirement 
is not simply section 401(a)(4). Instead, the IRS requirement is a pack-
age of rules consisting of sections 401(a)(4), 401(a)(26), and 410(b). 
Some other sections of the Code are also part of this nondiscrimina-
tion package, but this article will not dwell on these other sections. 
The purpose of sections 401(a)(26) and 410(b) is to ensure that a 
qualified plan generally covers a reasonably large number of employ-
ees of the plan sponsor who are not predominantly highly compensated. 
Code section 401(a)(26) requires that a minimum number of employees 
benefit under a qualified plan. Specifically, it requires that a plan must 
give benefits to at least 50 employees or 40 percent of the employees of 
the plan sponsor. Section 410(b) requires that there be a fair number of 
nonhighly compensated employees who benefit under a plan. The pro-
portion of nonhighly compensated employees receiving benefits under 
a plan generally must not be less than 70 percent of the proportion of 
highly compensated employees benefiting under the same plan. If this 
70 percent test is not satisfied, however, a plan can resort to an alter-
native test, known as the average benefit test, to satisfy section 41 O(b).l 
Finally, section 401(a)(4) tests the actual amount of benefits and other 
features of a plan to ensure that the nonhighly compensated employees 
covered under the plan receive benefits comparable to those received 
by the highly compensated employees. 
2 Cross-Testing 
The concept of cross-testing is actuarially simple. In a defined con-
tribution plan the allocations to employees' accounts are determined 
based on a formula contained in the plan document. The allocation 
formula must be definitely determinable in the sense that once the to-
tal contribution amount is known, each employee's allocation is deter-
mined without any further discretion of the plan sponsor or the plan 
administrator. Instead of testing these allocations for discrimination, 
their actuarially equivalent annuity benefits are tested. In other words, 
such allocations, when accumulated with interest to the employees' re-
tirement, must be capable of buying annuity benefits that are not dis-
criminatory. The regulations require that this actuarial equivalent con-
[The average benefit test will not be discussed here because of its complex technical 
details. 
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version, known as normalization, be done based on standard assump-
tions: namely, an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent and 
one of nine given mortality tables. Instead of these actuarially equiva-
lent accruals, their corresponding accrual rates, defined as the ratio of 
such accruals to employees' compensations, may be used in the nondis-
crimination testing. 
How are these normalized accruals or accrual rates tested for nondis-
crimination? Roughly speaking, a plan is divided into smaller plans 
known as rate groups, each defined by a highly compensated employee 
and each tested for coverage under section 410(b). A rate group con-
sists of a highly compensated employee and all employees (both highly 
and nonhighly compensated) with at least as high an accrual or accrual 
rate as this highly compensated employee. The underlying idea is that 
if the plan sponsor were to choose to establish a plan benefiting pre-
cisely the employees in this rate group, then this rate group would sat-
isfy section 410(b) and, therefore, there are a fair number of nonhighly 
compensated employees with at least as good a benefit as the highly 
compensated employee who defines this hypothetical plan. The main 
policy objective of these regulations is to ensure broad coverage and 
nondiscrimination in qualified plans. Because each rate group satisfies 
this main objective of the regulations, there is no reason that the plan 
as a whole should not be allowed. 
3 An Example 
To illustrate the methodology, consider a sponsor with 16 employ-
ees, all of whom are covered under a defined contribution plan. Among 
these employees HI and H2 are highly compensated, whereas the other 
employees (Nl through N14) are nonhighly compensated. Every em-
ployee receives an allocation equal to 4.5 percent of compensation, ex-
cept that HI receives 20 percent and N5 receives no allocation. How can 
such an allocation be achieved and be deemed definitely determinable? 
The plan sponsor could state in the plan document the precise alloca-
tion that each employee is to receive. The plan sponsor could use an 
integrated excess formula with appropriate integration level and dis-
parity and exclude N5 from receiving an allocation. The plan sponsor 
also could divide the employee group into three classes, receiving al-
locations of 20 percent, 4.5 percent, and 0 percent of compensation, 
respectively. 
Because 15 of the 16 employees benefit under the plan, section 
40l(a)(26) is satisfied. Because more than 70 percent of the nonhighly 
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Table 1 
Employee Data 
Ee Age Comp Alloe AeVal Equiv Rate 
Hl 46 $150,000 $30,000 $129,471 $12,973.05 8.65% 
H2 37 80,000 3,600 31,058 3,111.98 3.89% 
Nl 29 60,000 2,700 43,114 4,320.05 7.20% 
N2 25 60,000 2,700 58,656 5,877.38 9.80% 
N3 48 58,000 2,610 9,657 967.64 1.67% 
N4 45 42,000 1,890 8,809 882.69 2.10% 
N5 40 40,000 0 0 0.00 0.00% 
N6 35 40,000 1,800 18,113 1,814.91 4.54% 
N7 24 38,000 1,710 40,121 4,020.12 10.58% 
N8 30 36,000 1,620 23,952 2,400.03 6.67% 
N9 24 35,000 1,575 36,953 3,702.75 10.58% 
NI0 25 34,000 1,530 33,239 3,330.51 9.80% 
NIl 30 30,000 1,350 19,960 2,000.02 6.67% 
N12 29 23,000 1,035 16,527 1,656.02 7.20% 
N13 35 20,000 900 9,056 907,45 4.54% 
N14 22 16,000 720 19,704 1,974.35 12.34% 
Notes: Ee = Employee; Comp = Compensation; Alloc = Allocation; AcVal = 
Accumulated Value at age 65; Equiv = Equivalent Accrual; Rate = Accural 
Rate 
compensated employees benefit, section 410(b) is satisfied. Section 
40l(a)(4) cross-testing based on a testing age of 65 uses an interest rate 
of 8 percent and mortality in accordance with the 1983 Individual An-
nuity Female Mortality Table. The annuity purchase rate based on these 
assumptions is 9.98. The data and results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows the accrual rates arranged in descending order. 
Table 3 shows that both rate groups satisfy the 70 percent test in 
section 41 O(b). 
There are other ways to perform the testing procedure, e.g., imput-
ing Social Security benefits because part of these benefits is paid by 
the employer, using a testing period other than the current plan year, 
using the average benefit test instead of the 70 percent test for the rate 
groups, restructuring, etc. There are also difficulties that practitioners 
may face in practical situations, e.g., the required minimum allocation 
to a young, non-key, highly compensated employee in a top heavy plan 
may result in an unusually high actuarially equivalent annuity b-enefit. 
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Table 2 
Ordered Accural Rates 
Employee Accrual 
Rate(%) 
N14 12.34 
N7 10.58 
N9 10.58 
N2 9.80 
N10 9.80 
HI 8.65 
N1 7.20 
N12 7.20 
N8 6.67 
Nll 6.67 
N6 4.54 
N13 4.54 
H2 3.89 
N4 2.10 
N3 1.67 
N5 0.00 
Or the allocation to an old nonhighly compensated employee that is ac-
tuarially equivalent to an annuity benefit needed to pass the test may 
run into maximum limitation problem under section 415(c). Instead of 
dwelling on these technical details, we instead will focus on other is-
sues faced by practitioners. Practitioners must familiarize themselves 
with the technical difficulties and variations of cross-testing, however, 
before they apply it to their clients' plans. 
4 Benefits of Cross-Testing 
Why do some plan sponsors, especially those sponsoring small plans, 
favor plans based on the cross-testing technique? First, such employers 
are usually small business owners who have spent a lot of time culti-
vating a successful business and now are ready to plan for retirement. 
Owners obviously want to allocate as much as possible to their own 
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Rate 
H2 
Table 3 
Ratios for Various Rate Groups 
Highly Nonhighly 
Compensated 
Number Ratio 
1 1/2 
2 2/2 
Compensated 
Number Ratio 
5 5/14 
11 11/14 
Notes: NR:HR = Nonhigh Ratio to High Ratio. 
NR:HR 
71.43% 
78.57% 
accounts and, at the same time, likely will try to minimize what they 
must give to their rank-and-file employees. 
In a traditional nonintegrated defined contribution plan allocations 
are determined as a uniform percentage of plan participants' compen-
sations. In the case of small businesses, the owners are usually older 
than their employees. Thus, based on the same accrual rates, they will 
receive larger allocations, as a percentage of their compensations, than 
their employees simply because they are older and have larger deferred 
annuity factors. In our numerical example HI receives an allocation 
that is the highest as a percentage of compensation among all employ-
ees. His/her actuarially equivalent annuity benefit as a percentage of 
compensation, however, is not the highest. 
Another reason is that such plans, being defined contribution plans, 
are free of the long-term commitments inherent in defined benefit plans. 
Furthermore, the annual administration required in a defined contribu-
tion plan is usually much less burdensome than that in a defined ben-
efit plan. If a defined contribution plan is of the profit sharing type, 
it does not have a funding requirement. As long as the plan sponsor 
can demonstrate that there are substantial and recurring contributions, 
there is no need to contribute any required amount in any particular 
year. 
Does the above example seem nondiscriminatory? It seems that 
such allocations would not pass the so-called smell test, i.e., people 
would intuitively think that such allocations are discriminatory. Al-
though guidance on section 401(a)(4) existed before the publication of 
these regulations, the tests described in earlier guidance were not as 
clearly defined as those in these regulations. Due to this uncertainty 
and the possible challenge by the Internal Revenue Service, such a plan 
probably would not have been recommended by practitioners before 
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the nondiscrimination regulation package. The author believes that 
there are two main reasons for the change of practitioner attitudes. 
First, the regulation package opts for objective criteria. The conser-
vative practitioners who in the past would not have recommended such 
plans because they did not smell right have no doubt that such plans 
now are allowed simply because the tests are passed. In other words, 
even if a plan is designed to discriminate, it is not discriminatory in the 
eyes of the regulatory government agency. 
Second, Revenue Ruling 81-202, the guide made obsolete by this 
regulation package, had a safe harbor interest rate of 5 percent to 6 
percent. While Internal Revenue Service officials indicated that a higher 
interest rate would be allowed if the plan sponsor could demonstrate 
that its plan consistently had earned a higher rate of return, most prac-
titioners stayed in the safe harbor range. It is easy to demonstrate 
mathematically that the higher the interest rate, the higher the dispar-
ity in allocations between employees of different ages. The regulations 
now require that an interest rate between 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent 
be used, increasing the disparity due to age differences. As pointed 
out earlier, it is usually the case that highly compensated employees 
are older than nonhighly compensated employees. Thus, the disparity 
in favor of the highly compensated employees is now greater due to the 
use of a higher interest rate in the normalization. 
The objection would not be as much if these defined contribution 
plans are strictly age-weighted in the sense that the allocations are ac-
tuarially equivalent to the same annuity benefit (in dollar amount or as 
a percentage of compensation) for all employees. After all, this is how 
the normal cost is calculated under the unit credit actuarial funding 
method in defined benefit plans. A plan that applies this methodology 
and that gives HI the same allocation as in our previous example is 
shown in Table 4 below. When the allocations are converted to annu-
ity benefits commencing at the testing age of 65, all employees receive 
the same benefit as a percentage of compensation. For comparison 
purposes the allocations in our earlier example are shown next to this 
age-weighted plan. 
5 Criticisms of Cross-Testing 
The objection of most critics of cross-tested plans is that such plans 
are not strictly age-weighted. The structure of rate group testing allows 
a plan sponsor to use the demography of the plan population so that 
a relatively small increase in the allocations to young nonhighly com-
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Table 4 
Plan Allocations 
Age-Weighted Allocation in 
Employee Allocation Previous Example 
HI $30,000 $30,000 
H2 8,004 3,600 
N1 3,243 2,700 
N2 2,384 2,700 
N3 13,530 2,610 
N4 7,778 1,890 
N5 5,041 0 
N6 3,431 1,800 
N7 1,398 1,710 
N8 2,102 1,620 
N9 1,288 1,575 
N10 1,351 1,530 
NIl 1,751 1,350 
N12 1,243 1,035 
N13 1,716 900 
N14 505 720 
Total 84,765 55,740 
pensated employees can be used to avoid larger allocations to older 
nonhighly compensated employees that would be required on a strictly 
age-weighted basis. Further, in a strictly age-weighted plan, every young 
employee has the opportunity, as he or she ages, to grow to receive a 
larger allocation. The analogous situation in defined benefit plan fund-
ing is the increasing normal cost in the unit credit method as a person 
ages. But in the example above, an employee may never be able to grow 
into that situation as long as there are new young nonhighly compen-
sated employees that can help the plan pass rate group testing. 
Another objection is that although the policy reason of allowing a 
plan sponsor to do what it could do by utilizing separate plans is sound, 
the rate groups are not plans. They are not required to satisfy the par-
ticipation requirement in section 401(a)(26). If it were required, the 
example above would fail. Furthermore, our example is constructed 
so that each rate group passes the 70 percent coverage test of section 
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41O(b). Should a rate group fail such a test, it still can demonstrate its 
coverage by passing the alternative average benefit test. In this test the 
70 percent threshold is lowered to somewhere between 20.375 percent 
and 45 percent if another requirement on the relative benefits that em-
ployees receive is satisfied. The average benefit test for a rate group, 
however, is more liberal than the corresponding test for a plan. For 
example, one of the requirements for a plan to satisfy the average ben-
efit test is that the classification of employees covered under the plan 
be a reasonable one. A rate group does not need to satisfy such a re-
quirement. Thus, a rate group may not be a plan that could pass the 
nondiscrimination requirements if it were to exist alone. 
What should practitioners do? They have an obligation to their 
clients to design retirement plans that are legal and that are best for 
their clients. Because discrimination and nondiscrimination are defined 
by the government, practitioners will be remiss if they do not discuss 
this plan design with their clients whose objectives may be served best 
by cross-testing. 

